

## References

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Information given below should not be considered as confirmation of  
or as similar information received by other agencies.

1. In August 1950 Chinese Communist Army Headquarters (CCAH) established an Armored Force Command (AFC) and selected HSU Kuang-ta, commander of the 2 Army Group, 1 Field Army, to command it. HSU was directed to centralize command functions, and to train and expand armored troops throughout China.
2. The initial step in unifying the AFC began on 1 September when tank units of Special Army Groups subordinate to the various Field Armies were brought under the central command of the AFC. An AFC training base was established at Erhlangchuan (二狼莊), Ch'anghsintien (116-12, 39-49), with Soviet advisers and instructors. Service personnel were drawn from the 3 Tank Regiment and cadres of the armored battalion of the Northwest China Military Area. The mission of this training base was to create a second-line reserve force (sic). The 6,000 trainees consisted of the following: (a) Privates from the original parachute forces (sic); (b) Squad commanders from the various field armies; and (c) Young students and workers who voluntarily joined the army. The training program lasts between 12 and 18 months. Soviet instructors teach from mimeographed texts. Also used as a text is "Tanks in Combat," which has been translated by the North China Military Area. The training base is equipped with modern radio and radar facilities.
3. In October a Chinese Communist tank school was established in Tientsin. It was built around the original 3 Tank Regiment, and is the regular Chinese Communist school for training AFC officers. It has over 20 Soviet advisers and instructors, and 2,000 trainees, who are primarily platoon to battalion-grade cadres from armored units. The training period is three years.
4. These two training agencies are directly subordinate to the AFC. They are part of the permanent program for building up national defense and are separate from the training agencies given below, which were established especially for short-term training of specific tank units.

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5. The five major AFC short-term training centers are at Ssup'ingchieh (124-22, 43-11), Yungchi (126-32, 43-51), Suchow, Wh'anghsintien (116-12, 39-49) and Fengt'ai (116-17, 39-51). There are subsidiary training centers at other places such as Nanking and Hankow.
6. In October ten Soviet tank regiments arrived in China to help train and organize the AFC. All of these Soviet tank units had seen action during World War II and had been stationed in Berlin. The Soviet units were to turn over their equipment to the Chinese Communists after completion of the training program.<sup>2</sup>
7. The Soviet tank regiments that went to China were organized as follows:<sup>3</sup>
  - Regimental Commander
  - Deputy Regimental Commander in Charge of political training
  - Party Secretary (equivalent to Chinese Communist commissar)
  - Deputy Regimental Commander for administration
  - Deputy Regimental Commander for technical matters
  - Chief of Staff
  - Six Combat Companies : Four medium tank companies
  - One heavy tank company
  - One self-propelled artillery company
  - Two Service Companies : One transport company
  - One repair company
  - Three Independent Platoons: One communications platoon
  - One engineer platoon
  - One reconnaissance platoon
8. The Chinese Communist tank unit organization is modeled on the Soviet.
9. Intensive training of the AFC began in November. A Soviet tank regiment would train a Chinese Communist tank regiment during a three-month period, during which the two were formed into a single unit. Chinese Communist cadres were trained by Soviet personnel on the regimental headquarters level. Privates were taught by Soviet troops on the company or platoon level. During practice maneuvers, Chinese and Soviet soldiers worked side by side. The low caliber of the Chinese Communist trainees and the lack of technical qualifications, particularly in the use of Soviet tanks, and the limited time available for training kept the training program from reaching its expected level of results. Top AFC cadres are the old cadres of the PCA who have demonstrated their inability to understand the capabilities, tactics and command of tank warfare. Briefly, the AFC is not yet adequately trained.
10. In January the Chinese Communists recruited a large number of young students and workers for training in order to meet the problem of inadequate technical abilities among the officers and men in various armored units. When these recruits have completed training, the present training units will be re-organized.
11. In February 1951 five newly formed tank regiments, including regiments of the 1 Tank Division, of the AFC left for North Korea.<sup>4</sup> Before leaving for North Korea, the 1 Tank Division had taken over all of the Soviet equipment. Most of the Soviet officers and men of the units which had trained them had returned to Manchuria, leaving only a small number with the Chinese tank regiments, primarily as advisers. None of the tank regiments in Korea have taken part in combat. A few officers and men have "escaped" back into China.

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12. Before the 1 Tank Division entered North Korea, all of its officers and men were thoroughly instructed in the use of the designations and substitute designations (代號), which were designed to increase the security of the division's operations.<sup>5</sup> The Political Department of the 1 Tank Division printed a large number of pamphlets describing the system to be used, and distributed them to officers of company grade and higher. Just before the units left for Korea, all copies of this pamphlet were recalled and destroyed. After the distribution of these instructions, all officers and men were required to use the substitute designation instead of the actual unit designations. The Political Department ordered telephone operators not to connect any calls if the person calling did not use the substitute designations. Any loose talk within or outside of the division concerning substitute designations was prohibited; offenders would be considered guilty of disclosure of classified information.
13. By mid-April the AFC had organized three tank divisions and one independent tank regiment; one additional tank division and one independent tank regiment were in the process of formation.<sup>6</sup>
14. In mid-April the 1 Central Technological Plant of the Technological Department, Supply and Service Department, AFC, received a shipment of machinery from the USSR which is to be used for expanding the facilities of the plant. The plant has hired 800 additional (sic) workers, 200 from the railway shop in Ch'anghsintien.
15. In May 1951 the AFC was partially reorganized, and the following changes made:<sup>7</sup>
  - a. In October 1950 cadre control agencies were added to all Chinese Communist military organizations (from the Revolutionary Military Council through the military area level, the military district level and field army units down to and including the regimental level). These cadre control agencies were designed to exercise control over cadres of platoon grade and higher who were transferred to other posts. Since the AFC had only been in existence briefly at that time, no such cadre control organization was established within it. Subsequently, many cadres have been transferred to other troop units. In March 1951 the AFC petitioned CCAR to establish an agency within the AFC which will facilitate recalling its cadres whenever their services are needed. This new agency is now taking over personnel administrative records from the AFC Headquarters and from its Political Department.
  - b. When the AFC was first organized, a training office which was responsible for training all men in the AFC was placed under the joint supervision of AFC Headquarters and the Political Department. Last January the training office was placed under the sole jurisdiction of the Political Department. Recently the training office has been expanded into an independent organization on the same level as the Political Department and is now only responsible to the AFC and its Political Commissar. The AFC training base and the tank school are now directly under the control of the Training Department.
  - c. The designation of the Amphibious Tank Battalion of the 3 Field Army has been changed to the Independent Amphibious Tank Battalion. It is under the direct control of the AFC, but has been assigned to the East China Military Area.
  - d. On 1 May 1951 the AFC began to organize an Independent Border Defense Tank Battalion at Ch'anghsintien. The battalion comprises the following units: 1 Company (heavy tank company), 2 Company (medium tank company), 3 Company (medium tank company), 4 Company (light tank company), Search (sic) Platoon, Reconnaissance Platoon, Communications Platoon, Engineer Platoon and Transportation Platoon.

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The USSR will supply the equipment for the 1, 2 and 3 Companies; equipment for the 4 Company will consist of small tanks already in the possession of the Chinese Communists. Equipment for the remaining platoons will also be supplied by the USSR. Total strength of this battalion is 1,000 officers and men. Cadres for the battalion were drawn from the 1 Independent Tank Regiment. As soon as the battalion is organized, it will receive two months' training at Ch'anghsintien, then will move to some defense position on the national borders of China, possibly to coastal areas of South China.


- 25X1A 1. Comment. See Attachment A concerning the organization of the AFC.
- 25X1A 2. Comment. See Attachment G concerning training.
- 25X1A 3. Comment. This does not agree with available information on the organization of Soviet tank regiments.
- 25X1A 4. Comment. The other designations may be of the 2 Tank Division and the 1 Independent Tank Regiment. See Attachment E for biographical information on officers of the 1 Tank Division. See Attachment F concerning its departure for Korea. See Attachment I concerning the advance into Korea.
- 25X1A 5. Comment. See Attachment J for a list of the substitute designations.
- 25X1A 6. Comment. See Attachment C for the organization of a division, Attachment D for the organization of a regiment and Attachment H concerning the transfer of equipment.
- 25X1A 7. Comment. See Attachment B for a chart showing the reorganization.

Attachments:

Attachment A (1 page) : Armored Force Command  
 Attachment B (1 page) : Armored Force Command, after May reorganization  
 Attachment C (1 page) : Divisional Organization  
 Attachment D (1 page) : Regimental Organization  
 Attachment E (2 pages) : Biographical information on Officers of 1 Tank Division  
 Attachment F (1 page) : Departure of 1 Tank Division for Korea  
 Attachment G (1 page) : Soviet Adviser's Speech concerning Training Program  
 Attachment H (2 pages) : Presentation of Tanks and Oath-taking  
 Attachment I (1 page) : Address to 1 Tank Division after entering Korea  
 Attachment J (2 pages) : Substitute Designations of 1 Tank Division

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Chinese Communist  
Army Headquarters




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Attachment A

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
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Attachment B

ARMORED FORCE COMMAND


After May Reorganization

DIVISIONAL ORGANIZATION



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Attachment C

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REGIMENTAL ORGANIZATION



\* Each Company has 3 Platoons of 3 squads each.

M Medium Tank Company

H Heavy Tank Company

T Thompson Gun Company (sic)

\*\* This Company has 2 platoons

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Attachment E

Following are the biographical accounts of principal officers in the 1 Tank Division:

Division Commander - HUANG Hsien-ku (黃顯鵠) is 39 years old and a native of Anhwei. One the Chief of Staff of the 4th Column of the Chinese Communist Hopei-Shantung-Honan Military Region, he was appointed Tank Division Commander in July, 1950. He has entirely no experience in tank warfare.

Political Commissioner - LIU Teng-ying (劉登英) is a 42 year old veteran of the "Long March". He is a native of Szechuan. Due to a wound in his right chin received during the war with Japan, he is unable to talk fluently. He is physically weak, and has had no experience in tank warfare.

Deputy Division Commander - CHIAO Chieh (趙杰) is 38 years old and a native of Liaoyang, in the Northeast. Once the Cavalry Division Commander of the 4th Field Army, and was appointed to his present post in January 1951.

Deputy Political Commissioner - YANG Yung-sung (楊永松), is 45 years old, and a native of Szechuan. Details of his biographical record are as yet unknown.

Deputy Chief of Staff - CHIA Lin-yeh (賈林野), is 33 years old, and a native of Shansi. He joined the Army in 1937, fought in the North China areas, served as company, battalion and regiment commander, regiment political commissioner, and artillery unit commander. He is very capable and skillful in winning the support of the privates.

Head of the Political Department - MAO P'eng-yun (毛鵬雲), 37 years old, a native of Shantung, served as regiment political commissioner of the 4th Rank Regiment of the 4th Field Army. He was appointed to his present post in October of 1950.

Commander of the 1st Tank Regiment - Unknown.

Political Commissioner of the 1st Tank Regiment - HO Tung (賀東), 34 years old, served as chief of the organization division of the political department of a division of the 4th Field Army.

Head of the Political Bureau of the 1st Tank Regiment - LI Kao-sheng (李高昇), 36 years old, and a native of the Northeast, once served as instructor of the 1st Battalion of the 4th Tank Regiment of the 4th Field Army.

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Commander of the 2nd Tank Regiment - HSU Ming-lo (徐明樂), 35 years old, a native of Szechuan, and a veteran of the "Long March". He received Soviet Tank Training in Sinkiang. Since he is very timid and indecisive, the handling of regiment affairs lies entirely in the hands of the political commissioner and the Deputy Regimental Commander.

Political Commissioner of the 2nd Tank Regiment - WU Shih-chieh, 32 years old, and a native of Shansi, joined the army in 1938. He graduated from the Anti-Japanese College of Yenai, and has served as executive officer, company political director, battalion political director, head of regiment political bureau, and regiment political commissioner.

Deputy Commander of the 2nd Tank Regiment - CH'EN Chieh-fu (陳捷夫), 35 years old, and a native of Kwangtung, joined the army in 1938. He is near-sighted. He has served in tank units for five years, and is a very strict commander.

Chief of Staff of the 2nd Tank Regiment - YEH Wen-hui (葉文輝), 29 years old, and a native of Kwangtung, joined the Army in 1941. He served in the Tank units for five years, and is experienced in tank warfare.

Head of the Political Bureau of the 2nd Tank Regiment - YANG Yung-hsiu (楊永修), 30 years old, a native of Chengting, Hopei Province, joined the Army in 1938, and served as commander of an Artillery Battalion.

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Attachment FDeparture of the 1 Tank Division for Korea

1. The ten Soviet tank regiments concluded the initial three-month training period at the end of January 1951. The Armored Force Command (AFC) Political Department then began to give the ten Chinese Communist tank regiments Resist America and Aid Korea indoctrination and began the Resist America accusation campaign. (Previously the individual units had been given a systematic Resist America and Aid Korea education.) Each man was then encouraged to write a petition volunteering his services for combat, to prepare a written statement of his readiness to fight and to swear he would perform gallantly in action. At the same time, these regiments were tested for packing light equipment: 50 kilograms (sic) for each cadre and 10 kilograms for each private. Also the vehicles which they received from the Soviets were repainted.
2. In late February the AFC assigned the first group of military, political and supply personnel to the 1 Tank Division. These personnel ranged from the squad and platoon level to the battalion level. Each unit was also assigned two Korean interpreters. Then the tank divisions started to clean and inspect the arms and equipment. Each tank regiment was given 12 to 15 ten-wheel GMC trucks and one repair truck. All preliminary steps for going to Korea were completed, but no travel orders had been issued by the CCA.
3. HSU Kuang-ta, head of the AFC, addressed the 1 Tank Division, telling them that they had a great possibility of going to Korea and asking them to be patient. He assured them that they would start just as soon as orders were received.
4. On 10 February HSIAO Hua, deputy head of the Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Council, addressed personnel of the 1 Tank Division above company grade. He said, "Higher authorities have decided to send five tank regiments to take part in the Korea war. They will be accompanied by a large air force and artillery units. There will be large-scale fighting by the end of spring or the beginning of summer. However, unless there is need, you will not be used recklessly. Consequently, when you get to Korea, you will have to wait for the opportune moment to participate in combat. The greatest difficulty we have faced is lack of control of the air. When we put such a gigantic unit of armored vehicles in motion, we are likely to meet air raids. You all must take anti-air raid precautions as one of your major tasks, and the central authorities are now seeking a solution to this problem. Although you must be extremely cautious, there is no need to fear. We have a special advantage, i.e., your Fatherland is close to Korea and whenever necessary you can come right back. The supply problem is very difficult, but if you economize as much as possible, we can surely overcome it."
5. On 11 February the AFC issued marching orders, and two regiments of the 1 Tank Division immediately left for Manchuria en route to Korea. The tank regiments in Korea are at Pyongyang and nearby areas. Headquarters of the 1 Tank Division is at Pyongyang, and the supply depot responsible for furnishing gasoline is at Ssup'ingchieh.

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Attachment C

To initiate the training program, Major General Ssu-wei-tzu-lo-fu, the Soviet adviser, addressed the Chinese Communist Armored Force cadres of company grade or higher on 2 November. In this address (which is summarized below) he briefly outlined the training program.

We have been instructed by Marshal Stalin to come to China and assist you in creating a strong Armored Force. The creation of this force has two prerequisites: First, there must be sufficient weapons to equip the force; and second, all officers and troops of this force must understand the weapons and learn to use them effectively. Consequently, our mission here includes these two requirements. We shall try to make you all well acquainted with the techniques of tank operations in a limited period of time, and then we shall turn over to you all the weapons we brought with us. This time we brought ten tank regiments; all the officers and men of these regiments have been assigned the two tasks mentioned above. For many reasons it will be necessary for us to complete these tasks as early as possible. Our training program will last initially for a period of three months; this can either be shortened or extended if any special circumstances require a modification. Such modification, however, must be decided by the highest authorities in the Soviet Union and in China. Our training program must appear very peculiar, for there is no precedent of one army training another army. We are trying to have one army train another army, because we want to build up very quickly ten new tank regiments having modern equipment, and to cultivate friendly relations among Soviet and Chinese officers and among Soviet and Chinese troops, which will be of mutual benefit to both of us now and in the future. The cardinal point of our training program now is to give each person a thorough understanding of one particular item; e.g. a driver must learn how to drive well and a gunner must learn how to shoot well. Once each individual learns his special task well, it will be adequate if he knows only a little about matters falling outside his specific task. Officers must study tank tactics, compare operations and maintenance; since time is limited they too must do practical work and understand it thoroughly. The ten Soviet regiments and the ten Chinese regiments will work together in their study and practice, officers with officers and soldiers with soldiers. If we go ahead along these lines, we can be sure to complete the training program within the set time limit. There will be no way for you to acquire actual combat experience until you arrive at the battle front; consequently, when this training program is finished, I hope you all will have a chance to take part in actual combat, so that you will be able to progress by gaining combat experience and will be able to make yourselves into the strongest cadres in the Armored Force of New China. There is no need for me to dwell on the details of the program. These will be passed to you by the regimental commanders in charge of the training. Finally, I wish you all success and good health.

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Attachment H

The ten Soviet tank regiments which came to China to train ten Chinese Communist armored regiments turned over all of their equipment after the completion of this training. The following describes the procedure followed in making this transfer.

1. Three days before the actual transfer both Soviet and Chinese cadres of the regimental level and higher met to discuss the transfer procedure, the date and the inventory of equipment which was to be distributed to units of the regimental level and below.
2. All officers and men of the Chinese Communist and of the Soviet regiments attended a mass meeting on the day of the actual transfer. The Chinese and Soviet commanding officers addressed the assembly. Then the Chinese Communist officers and men who were taking over the equipment went through an oath-swearing ceremony. This ceremony took place in the large motor park; the tanks were lined up with Soviet tank crews standing in front of the vehicles to be transferred and Chinese who were to receive the vehicles facing them. Then the Chinese Communists led by the leader of each rank, read aloud the following oath.

"Oh! Tanks, in World War II you marched straight from the Soviet plain into Berlin and demonstrated your power at the European front. You together with the Red Army of the Soviet Union destroyed Hitler and brought the World War II to a victorious end.

Now as the American Imperialists are prosecuting a mad programme of slaughter in Korea and are going to invade our great Fatherland, I now face you - companion of steel - and take the following oath:

- 1/ That I shall determinedly exhibit your power and destroy thoroughly the American Imperialists;
- 2/ That I shall protect you as I would protect my own life;
- 3/ That I shall always be with you, dead or alive, and that no matter where you are, you will find me at your side."

\_\_\_\_ Month \_\_\_\_ Day \_\_\_\_ Company \_\_\_\_ Platoon

Tank Commander:	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Gunner :	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Cannoncer :	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Driver :	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Radio Operator:	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Following this oath the Soviet tank commander presented the inventory to the Chinese Communist tank commander who was receiving the equipment, and the actual transfer began.

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The transfer of equipment for a regiment took about ten days to complete because it was carried out in great detail. The vehicles, their weapons and the motors all had to be handled separately (but the tanks were not dis-assembled). After the transfer of the vehicles, then the ammunition and other equipment was transferred. When transfer had been completed the Chinese Communists engaged in three day practice exercises. It was only after the Chinese Communists demonstrated that they had mastered the maintenance, operation and use of this equipment that the Soviet officers and men could be considered as having completed their mission.

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Attachment I

CH'AI Ch'uan-jo (柴川若) of the Propaganda Division, Political Department of the Volunteers' Advance Headquarters, shortly after Chinese Communist Armored units entered Korea, addressed the cadres of platoon grade and above in order to build up their morale and brief them on the Korean War situation. This address is summarized below.

The Third Field Army units entered the Korean War when the situation had become very critical and after the North Korean Peoples' Army had retreated to the banks of the Yalu River. Our armed units which crossed that river had to face a gigantic United Nations offensive. They operated in a very small area and had no heavy weapons. Consequently, we decided to infiltrate a division, carrying only light machine guns and rifles, into the enemy rear. This entire force from the division commander down to the privates marched on foot through numerous mountain paths which the enemy believed to be inaccessible. They crushed the South Korean forces at the East Coast, and then went straight to the enemy's rear. This broke the enemy front and forced them to fall back with heavy casualties. It was a complete victory for us. Since the details have been reported by the New China News Agency it is unnecessary for me to repeat them here. However, I wish to call your particular attention to two factors connected with that campaign which may be of use to you in future campaigns.

1. When our units had reached the enemy's rear, the enemy put out a regiment to cover their retreat. One of our platoons received instructions to resist and to hold on for at least twelve hours. During this twelve hours this platoon never yielded an inch of ground in spite of the enemy's blanket artillery fire. Its casualties were small. The major reasons for the success of this platoon were first, courage, and second, intelligence. Since they had courage and were not afraid of death they never fell back. Since they were intelligent, each soldier knew exactly how to hide himself. They dug in half way up the hill and dug their foxholes thirty feet apart. By so doing they reduced the killing power of the enemy air and artillery fire and accomplished their mission.

2. Our units encircled some enemy troops near Ling Tsin Hu. Our men held high ground all around the encircled unit and began to destroy them. The enemy mobilized large numbers of aircraft to bomb our position and to aid them break through our encirclement. At this moment our artillery units adopted the tactics of firing from all directions to escape enemy aircraft observation and to strike hard at the encircled enemy. When the enemy planes aimed at the East Section, our artillery fired from the South, West and North Sections; when the enemy planes shifted their attention to the West, our firing would begin from the East, South and North Sections. In this way we were able to achieve our purpose and reduce our casualties to a minimum.

Although these factors are not entirely applicable to tank warfare, their guiding principles should be borne in mind. To insure our victory I hope all of you will begin to study the situation as much as you can.

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Attachment J

## SUBSTITUTE DESIGNATIONS OF THE 1ST TANK DIVISION

ACTUAL DESIGNATION	PREScribed SUBSTITUTE DESIGNATIONS	REMARKS
1st Tank Division	147th troop unit	
Division Headquarters Command Office	1st regiment, 147th troop unit	This is probably the operations staff, corresponding to the G-3 in U. S. Army divisions or to the Division Command Post.
Political Dept.	2nd regiment, 147th troop unit	
Supply Dept.	3rd regiment, 147th troop unit	
Medical Dept.	4th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Supply Technical Dept.	5th regiment, 147th troop unit	
1st Tank Regiment	6th Regiment, 147th troop unit	
Regimental Command Post	1st squad, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Political Dept.	2nd squad, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Bureau of Supply	3rd squad, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Medical Corps	4th squad, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Technical Office	5th squad, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Management Section	6th squad, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit	created after entering Korean war.
Subordinate Units of 1st Tank Regiment		
1st Company	1st Battalion, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit	
1st Platoon	1st Company, 1st battalion, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit	

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ACTUAL DESIGNATION	PRESCRIBED SUBSTITUTE DESIGNATIONS	REMARKS
2nd platoon	2nd Company, 1st bat- talion, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit	
3rd platoon	3rd Company, 1st bat- talion, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit	
2nd Company	2nd battalion, 6th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	Substitute designations for subordinate units of these companies follow the model given above for the 1st company, e.g. the 1st platoon of the 2nd company will have the substitute designation "1st company, 2nd bat- talion, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit".
3rd Company	3rd battalion, 6th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	
4th Company	4th battalion, 6th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	
5th Company	5th battalion, 6th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	
6th Company	6th battalion, 6th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	
Transport Company	7th battalion, 6th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	
Repair Company	8th battalion, 6th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	
Reconnaissance platoon	1st direct company, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Communications platoon	2nd direct company, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Engineers platoon	3rd direct company, 6th regiment, 147th troop unit	
2ND Tank Regiment	7th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Regimental Command Post	1st squad, 7th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Political Dept.	2nd squad, 7th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Bureau of Supply	3rd squad, 7th regiment, 147th troop unit	

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ACTUAL DESIGNATION	PREScribed SUBSTITUTE DESIGNATIONS	REMARKS
Medical Dept.	4th squad, 7th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Technical Office	5th squad, 7th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Management Section	6th squad, 7th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Subordinate units of 2nd Tank Regiment		
1st company	1st battalion, 7th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	The substitute desig- nations for subordinate units of these companies follow the model given above for the 1st Company, e.g. 1st platoon, 1st company of the 2nd Tank Regiment would be 1st platoon, 7th regiment, 147th troop unit.
2nd company	2nd battalion, 7th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	
3rd company	3rd battalion, 7th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	
4th company	4th battalion, 7th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	
5th company	5th battalion, 7th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	
6th company	6th battalion, 7th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	
Transport Company	7th battalion, 7th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	
Repair company	8th battalion, 7th regi- ment, 147th troop unit	
Reconnaissance platoon	1st direct company, 7th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Communication platoon	2nd direct company, 7th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Engineers platoon	3rd direct company, 7th regiment, 147th troop unit	

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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ACTUAL DESIGNATIONS	PREScribed SUBSTITUTE DESIGNATIONS	REMARKS
Motorized infantry regiment	8th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Regimental command post	1st squad, 8th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Political Dept.	2nd squad, 8th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Supply Dept.	3rd squad, 8th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Medical Dept.	4th squad, 8th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Technical office	5th squad, 8th regiment, 147th troop unit	
Subordinate units of the motorized infantry regiment		
1st battalion	1st battalion, 8th regiment, 147th troop unit	Where there is the grade of battalion above the company, the company is called a company (chung tui) and its platoons are called platoon (fen tui). So the 1st platoon, 1st company, 1st battalion would be 1st platoon, 1st company, 1st battalion, 8th regiment, 147th troop unit.
1st company	1st company, 1st battalion, 8th regiment, 147th troop unit	
2nd company	2nd company, 1st battalion, 8th regiment, 147th troop unit	
3rd company	3rd company, 1st battalion, 8th regiment, 147th troop unit	
2nd battalion	2nd battalion, 8th regiment, 147th troop unit	The substitute designations of the companies and platoons of the 2nd battalion are the same as those of the 1st battalion.

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ACTUAL DESIGNATIONS	PREScribed SUBSTITUTE DESIGNATIONS	REMARKS
Motorized artillery regiment	9th regiment, 147th troop unit	The substitute designations of the units of the regimental headquarters and of its one battalion are the same as those of the motorized infantry regiment.
Pack artillery battalion	1st direct battalion, 147th troop unit	Its companies are called (chung tui) i.e. company, and its platoons (fen tui) i.e. platoon. Their substitute designations are the same as those of the 1st battalion of the motorized infantry regiment.
Engineers battalion	2nd direct battalion, 147th troop unit	same as above
Communications battalion	3rd direct battalion, 147th troop unit	same as above
Reconnaissance battalion	4th direct battalion, 147th troop unit	same as above
Headquarters company	5th direct battalion, 147th troop unit	Its platoons are called (chung tui) i.e. companies. The arrangement of substitute designations remains the same.
Supply transport battalion	1st battalion, 3rd regiment, 147th troop unit	Its companies are called (chung tui) and platoons (fen tui). The arrangement of substitute designations remains the same.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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## II. SUBSTITUTE DESIGNATIONS FOR OFFICERS

ACTUAL DESIGNATIONS	:	SUBSTITUTE DESIGNATIONS	:	REMARKS
Commanding officer	:	22	:	
Political commissar	:	23	:	
Deputy Division commander	:	24	:	
Chief of Staff	:	25	:	
Deputy Political commissar	:	26	:	
Head of Political Department	:	27	:	
Head of Supply Department	:	28	:	
Head of Medical Department	:	29	:	
Head of Technical Department	:	30	:	
Regimental Commander, 1st Tank Regiment	:	42	:	
Regimental political Commissar	:	43	:	
Deputy Regimental Commander	:	44	:	
Deputy Regimental Political Commissar	:	45	:	
Chief of Staff	:	46	:	
Head of Political Bureau	:	48	:	
Combat Staff Officer	:	49	:	
Reconnaissance Staff Officer	:	32	:	

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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ACTUAL DESIGNATIONS	:	PRESCRIBED DESIGNATIONS	:	REMARKS
Communications Staff Officer	:	33	:	
Chemical Warfare Staff Officer	:	34	:	
Engineer	:	35	:	(staff officer of the Engineer unit)
Chief of the combat section	:	36	:	
Chief of Propaganda Section	:	37	:	
Head of Supply Bureau	:	38	:	
Head of the Technical Bureau	:	39	:	
Commander of the Medical Corps	:	40	:	
Head of Management Section	:	41	:	
Regimental Commander, 2nd Tank Regiment	:	52	:	The order of the substitute designations from 51 to 60 is the same as that of the 1st regiment.
Commander of Motorized Infantry Regiment	:	72	:	The order of the substitute designations from 71 to 80 is the same as that of the 1st regiment.
Commander of Motorized Artillery Regiment	:	92	:	The order of the substitute designations from 91 to 100 is the same as that of the 1st regiment.
Commander of pack artillery battalion	:	102	:	
Commander of Engineer Battalion	:	106	:	

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ACTUAL DESIGNATIONS	PREScribed SUBSTITUTE DESIGNATIONS	REMARKS
Commander of Communication Battalion	108	
Commander of Reconnaissance Battalion	110	
Commander of the Headquarters Company	114	
Commander of the Transport Battalion	120	

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- 1/ Troop unit - Pu Tui (部隊)
- 2/ Regiment - Chih Tui (支隊)
- 3/ Battalion - Ta Tui (大隊)
- 4/ Company - Ta Tui (大隊) (when there is no battalion between it and the regiment)  
Chung Tui (中隊) (when there is battalion between it and the regiment)
- 5/ Platoon - Chung Tui (中隊) (when the company above it is called Ta Tui)  
Fen Tui (分隊) (when the company above it is called Chung Tui)
- 6/ Squad - Hsiao Tui (小隊)

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